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Lorensen: Criminal Venue in West Virginia

Criminal Venue in West Virginia
WILLARD

D. LORENSEN*

West Virginia labors under the narrowest type of criminal venue
provision to be found in the state constitutions in the United States
today. A sizeable number of states have no constitutional provision

at all relating to this problem, but most do. These venue provisions
vary considerably. Some are quite general and broad, such as that
found in the present Maryland constitution which asserts that it is
important that a trial be held where the facts occurred,' or the
Vermont provision that a defendant is entitled to a trial by a jury of
the "country" (not "county").' Some provisions use relatively flexi'3
ble and plastic terms such as the Virginia reference to "vicinage
and otherwise popular standard of "county or district previously
defined by law." 4 Legislatures, in vicinage or district style states,
usually have some discretion in delineating the geographical boundaries of a venue locale.5 A dozen or so states are more tightly
bound up by the most restrictive type of state constitutional criminal
venue provision which limits criminal venue to the county where
the crime was committed.6 This is the substance of the West Virginia
provision. 7 Reviewing the matter about two decades ago, Professor
Blume of Michigan complained with regard to the West Virginia
type of provision that: "Taken all together . . . the states having
these narrow vicinage and venue provisions in their constitutions do
not have satisfactory venue statutes, and cannot have them until this

* Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
MD.
2 VT.

CONST. art. 20.

CONST. ch I, art. 10. See discussion of the provision in State v.
Brown, 103 Vt. 312, 154 A. 579 (1931).
3 VA. CONST. art. I, §8.
" E.g., COLO. CONST. art. II,§16- ILL. CONST. art. I, §9; KAN. CONST.
Bill of Rights §10; Wis. CONST. art. I, 47.
- State v. Robinson, 14 Minn. 447 (1869); State ex rel. Braun v. Stewart,
60 Wis. 587, 19 N.W. 429 (1884). But see Weyrich v. People, 89 Ill.
90
(1878)
(indicating a district must be a division within a county.).
6
Am. CONST. art. II, §24; AnK. CONST. art. II, §10; FLA. CoNsT.
Declaration of Rights §11; GA. CONST. art. IV, §14, par. 6; IND. CONST. art.
I, §13; MIss. CONST. art. 3, §26; Mo. CONST. art I, §18(a) N.H. CONST.
Pt. I, art. 17; OIo CONST. art. I, §10; OxLA. CONST. art. II, §20; ORE. CoNsT.
art. I, §11; S.C. CONST. art. I, §17; TENN. CONsT. art I, §9; WASH. CONST.
art. I, §22; W. VA. CONST. art. 111, §14.
7 W. VA. CONST.art. III, §14: "Trial of crimes, and misdemeanors, unless
herein otherwise provided, shall be by a jury of twelve men, public, without
unreasonable delay, and in the county where the alleged offence was committed, unless upon petition of the accused, and for good cause shown,
it is removed to some other county ... "

[163]
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unfortunate constitutional limitation is removed." 8 Certainly the
existing statutory venue provisions of the West Virginia Code deserve
the dismal description proffered by Professor Blume. They are, to
be generous, "not satisfactory." But then that complaint would
apply to much of the Code. Certainly, the criminal provisions of
West Virginia's statutes are on the whole miserably disjointed,
obsolete, and some are just plain silly.' The more significant question
is, can anything be done about it, short of constitutional change."
Does the constitution compel this unhappy state of affairs with
regard to venue. Professor Blume's pessimistic prognostication suggests that the problem is a constitutional one. I would disagree.
Certainly the constitutional provision is unfortunately and unnecessarily narrow, but there is adequate authority left to the
legislature to provide sensible and fair venue provisions. To be sure,
West Virginia suffers presently from a dismal set of venue principles,
but the suffering is needless.
The thesis of this paper is that venue provisions which are both
fair and practical could be adopted by the West Virginia legislature
without offending the present constitutional provision. A general
venue statute that would permit criminal trials in any county where
any substantial element of an offense properly charged has occurred
would provide such a standard. Such a provision would be fair
to the criminal defendant in that it would require some significant
and real connection between the place of the crime and the place of
trial. The standard would be fair to the demands of efficient administration of criminal justice in that it would not make the validity of
a criminal trial hinge upon the identification of some crucial venue
fixing element after trial." Such a standard could be linked with
procedural techniques which would require the venue issue to be
identified and contested before trial, thus avoiding the potential for
wastefulness that exists under present law.
8 Blume, The Place of Trial of Criminal Cases, 43 MIcH. L. REV. 59, 92
(1945).
9E.g., W. VA. CODE, ch. 61, art. 6, §16 (Michie 1966) (forbidding the
wearing of large hats by women in theatres.)
,0The West Virginia Commission on Constitutional Revision, created by
West Virginia Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 5, 1957, recommended some
changes in the venue provision of the present State Constitution in the course

of its study. See Appendix 2A, 1963 W.

Va. House of Delegates Journal.

The suggested changes were not submitted by the legislature to the people for
ratification.
" See State v. Pietranton, 140 W. Va. 444, 84 S.E.2d 774 (1954) for
an example of how after-the-fact venue determinations seem to make a game
of the administration of criminal justice.
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The breadth of the legislative power to prescribe where criminal
trials may be held is the question. The range of permissible choice
is obviously limited by the constitution. And the constitution is in
turn related to the common law doctrines of criminal venue which
in turn bear some kinship with common law concepts of subject
matter jurisdiction. The uncertain nature of these relationships has
evoked a doctrinal lineage of dubious ancestry. The ease with which
constitutional and common law issues may be confused beclouds
choices that are both important and subtle. What is common law
and what is constitutional law is quite different, but it is a difference
ofttimes overlooked. This misconception of the nature of the issue
in some instances has lead the court unwittingly to encumber the
range of legislative choice. The problem at this late date is to sort
out the venue issue so that it may be weighed and measured on its
own merits and to ascertain what is left of the legislative prerogative.
What prompts the present discussion is the recent decision of the
Supreme Court of Appeals in Willis v. O'Brien.'2 That case involved
a prosecution for murder in one county, where the death occurred,
based upon an allegation that the death resulted from a criminal
abortion performed in another country. The labored efforts of the
court to justify this rather unstartling result seemed curious. But
the more provocative aspect of Willis v. O'Brien is not that it is an
anomaly, but rather its exorbitant shadow boxing is commonplace.
The venue issue need not be so uncommonly difficult. No doubt it
will take legislative action to clear up the present state of affairs.
And thus, the legislature's prerogatives must be measured with some
care.
The history of how venue came to have constitutional importance
provides an important starting point. The connection between the
venue issue and the American Revolution discloses not only how that
issue became a matter of fundamental importance worthy of constitutional concern, but it also suggests the underlying rationale important
to present day problems of interpretation. The words employed in
the various state constitutions are different and necessarily produce
some differences in venue doctrine from state to state. But all are
built on more or less a common central theme that can be gleaned
from the common starting point. Informed application of today's
constitutional venue provision must proceed upon a clear understanding of the central historic rationale of the right.
12

153 S.E.2d 178 (W. Va. 1967).
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The jury's connection with the place of the crime originated as
a natural necessity. The jury was first a fact-knowing-not a factfinding body. 3 The jury had to come from the place of the crime
in order to bring forth the necessary knowledge of the criminal event.
The transition of the jury from a fact-knowing to a fact-finding body
probably occurred in the 12th century."4 In 1538 Parliament first
moved to free the administration of criminal justice from some of the
limitations that still lingered from the tradition of the jury as a factknowing body.' 5 This limitation was that the jury could take cognizance of no facts occurring outside of the county where it was sitting.
Under such constraint, an indictment for murder could not be
returned where a mortal wound was inflicted in one county and
the death occurred in another, since a single jury in one county could
not acknowledge the occurrance of both of these essential facts.'"
The evolution of the common law fiction of continuing trespass
which allowed a thief to be prosecuted in any county into which
he carried stolen goods,' 7 mixed with other early statutes of narrow
application,' " overcame most of the early common law venue
problems. It is important to note that the early common law doctrines
of venue were evolving in such a way as to permit practical accommodations.
Problems of more serious dimension arose in the decade and a
half that preceded the Declaration of Independence."' During this
period of time the English government struggled with the increasingly
difficult problems of colonial administration. Yankee trading with
'1

See generally 1

HoLDswORTH,

HISTORY

OF ENGLISH

LAW,

312-37

(7th ed. 1956).
14

5

1 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE §8 (3rd ed. 1940).

&3 Edw. VI, c. 24.

1

2

16

See 4

171

BLAcKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
HALE, PLEASE To THE CRowN,

*304.

*507-08 (Wilson ed. 1778). The

effect of the continuing trespass doctrine has had different effects. In
Worthington v. State, 58 Md. 403 (1882) the court held that the theft of
a horse in West Virginia could be prosecuted in Maryland where the stolen
horse was taken. In Strouther v. Commonwealth, 92 Va. 789, 22 S.E. 852
(1895) just the opposite was held, though the court said that a theft in any
county in Virginia could be prosecuted in any other county in Virginia where
the stolen goods were taken.
8 There is considerable parliamentary activity in the venue area. See
various acts collected and briefed in Blume, The Place of Trial of Criminal
Cases, 43 MICH. L. REv. 59, 62-63 (1945). See also 1 STEPHEN, HIsToRY OF
TE CRImiNAL LAW OF ENGLAND 276-80 (1883).
19

For an excellent work on this period generally see GIPSON, THE COMINC
standard is VAN

OF THE REVOLUTION 1763-1765 (1954). Still a respected
TYNE, THE CAUSES OF THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE (1922).
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the French violated British law and made more difficult the British
struggle to establish its colonial authority in North America. The
cost of these struggles led the British government to seek revenues
in the colonies that would help to pay the cost of colonial defense.2 °
Illegal commerce vexed the royal government because it both
escaped taxation and gave succor to the French. Near the center of
the storm that arose around the attempts of the British government
to maintain control over the administration of law in the colonies
was the problem of the colonial jury. Colonial juries, not surprisingly,
tended to be sympathetic to colonial interests. Two chief methods
were resorted to by the crown to avoid the nullification by jury
sympathy of unpopular royal law. One of these was to shift the
burden of administering tax laws to the admirality courts which sat
without juries. The first Stamp Act Congress of 1765 reacted to the
use of the admiralty proceedings by insisting on the right of trial
by jury.2" More drastic steps followed. In December 1768, the House
of Lords adopted resolutions calling upon the King to issue a special
commission to inquire of offenses within the realm "pursuant to the
provisions of the statute of the thirty-fifth year of the reign of King
Henry VIII."22 The ancient statute referred to provided for the
trial of treason before a commission wherever the King might direct.
And, in 1772, an act to protect His Majesty's dockyards also provided
that persons charged with violations could be tried either within
the realm or where the offense might have been committed.2 3 Increasingly, there was threat of transportation to England for trial.
Reflecting this growing concern about the threat to the right of
the protection of the colonial jury, the First Continental Congress
meeting in 1774 asserted:
That the respective colonies are entitled to the common law
of England, and more specifically to the great and inestimable
2 0

See Sosin, A Post-Script to the Stamp Act, 64 Am. HIsT. REv. 918
(1958) expressing the view that the essential aim of the Stamp Act was to
raise in America some of the funds needed to maintain British troops in
America for the defense of the Colonists.
ACT CoNGREss, Par. 7 (Oct. 19, 1765)
21 REsoLUTIONs OF =m STr
in PERRY & COOPER, SotcEs OF oun LmERTmS 270 (1959). Note also the
statement of John Adams in "Instructions to the town of Braintree, Massachusetts on the Stamp Act, October 14, 1765," at 268 in Perry & Cooper.
22 16 HANsARD, PARLIAimNTARY DEBATES TO THE YEAR 1803 476-80
(1813). The statement is set out in Blume, The Place of Trial of Criminal
Cases, 43 MIcH. L. REv. 59, 63 (1945). See also the discussion in PERRY &
COOPER, SoUncEs OF oUR LIBERTmS 270,281-82 (1959).
23

12 Geo. III, c. 24.
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privilege of being tried by their peers of the vicinage, according
to the course of that law.2 4
When the final and dramatic break came and the colonists declared
their independence on July 4, 1776, there was woven into the fabric
of the protest against the mother country a vigorous complaint about
attempts to deny the jury trial and venue privileges accorded by
the common law. Thus, the Declaration of Independence, asserts:
He [the King] has combined with others to subject us to a
jurisdiction foreign to our Constitution, and unacknowledged
by our laws: giving his assent to their acts of pretended
legislation; * * *
For depriving us, in many cases, of the benefits of trial by
jury;
For transporting us beyond seas to be tried for pretended
offenses; * * *
Thus it was that the claim for the privilege of venue came to occupy
a position of fundamental importance in the American legal order.
While the tampering with venue privileges was justly a matter of
considerable concern in the Revoluntionary movement, the treatment
accorded that matter in the first constitutions of the original states
was surprisingly moderate.25 In six of the original state constitutions
there was no mention at all of criminal venue. Three others provided
generally that the trial of facts where they occurred was an important
right. In only two of the original states, South Carolina and Georgia,
did first constitutions expressly limit the trial of crimes to the counties
where they were committed. Virginia from the start limited the trial
of crimes to a "vicinage" requirement. Pennsylvania adopted this
terminology in 1790 after its original constitution of 1776 briefly
provided for a trial by jury of the "country." In contrast, an
increasing proportion of later-joining states adopted the more restrictive types of constitutional venue provisions relating to criminal trials.
Reflecting on this phenomena Professor Blume has speculated:
In the states which had ... [a colonial background] the constitution writers were fully aware of the English venue statutes,
Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress, Oct. 14,
PERRY & COOPER, SouRcES OF OUR LmvnTms 270, 288
(1959).
25 See Blume, The Place of Trial of Criminal Cases, 43 Micu. L. REv.
59, 67-78 (1945), where these provisions are collected and analyzed.
24

1774, N.C.D. 5, in
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some of which were in force in the colonies; they took into
account colonial statutes which had authorized in certain
situations the trial of crimes in counties other than where
committed; they were alert to the dangers which would result
from transportation out of the state or to some distant place
for trial. The same was true of the judges who interpreted the
constitutions in later years.
The problem of the early constitution writers was to guard
against the dangers of transportation without taking from the
legislatures the power to regulate venue within a state ... "
But lauding the foresight of the draftsmen of the original state
constitutions while lamenting the lack of it in the drafters of the
latter versions is an unproductive enterprise that concedes too much.
There are more plausible explanations for the more predominate
use of restrictive venue provisions which would not compel extension
of the worst of these restrictions, but would allow the constraining
influences of these language choices to be moderated. The language
of the federal constitution, identifying state and district as specific
political entities to which venue limitations could be tied no doubt
exercised a considerable influence on the approach to drafting similar
provisions in state constitutions.2" In some instances, states copied
literally the distinct terminology, though district had no particular
meaning as a political subdivision within the state concerned.2 In
other instances, the pattern was probably influential in a more subtle
way; the use of a specified political subdivision in connection with
the drafting of a venue provision seems naturally to promote precision
and clarity. Drafting in those days, as now, no doubt appeared to
many as a task of adapting rather than creating. Moreover, the nineteenth century, during which many of the present day state constitutions were drafted, was marked by an increasing concern for
detail and elaboration. Thoroughness and precision were looked
26

Id. at 78.

The state and district terminology comes from Amendment VI: "In
all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law ..
" Another venue provision also appears in art. III, §2, par.
3: "The trial of crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury;
and such trial shall be held in the State where the said crime shall have
been committed; but when not committed within any state, the trial shall
be at2 8such place or places as the Congress may by law have directed."
See Armstrong v. State, 41 Tenn. (1 Caldwell) 338 (1860) holding
that "district" was a term of no meaning in Tennessee, having been copied
heedlessly from an earlier constitution.
27
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upon as marks of refinement in drafting. The failure to draft state
constitutions in broad and flexible terms expressing principles rather
than minute rules provokes much frustration in state government
today. The movement toward state constitutional reform of the
present era is directed at tearing down artificial barriers that are
the legacy of overwritten constitutions of the last century. It could
well be that the significant number of states that wrote into their
constitutions a criminal venue provision which limits criminal trials
to "the county" in which the crime was committed is a reflection of
these influences in the drafting of constitutions generally. If these
factors furnish an explanation, then speculation about underlying
intent changes. It becomes specious to argue that the choice of
seemingly narrow terminology imposes forever an obligation to rigorously restrain the legislature on the venue issue. It becomes fair to
argue that the narrow langauge on its face imposes certain restraints,
but it does not command adherence to perpetual policy of constraint.
When West Virginia separated from Virginia, the old Virginia
constitutional provision related to venue employed the term "vicinage." This standard was abandoned in favor of the narrower term
"county." That this change narrows the legislative choice in fixing
venue is obvious. The problem is how much has it been narrowed.
There is no indication in the historical record surrounding the
adoption of the West Virginia venue provision that the delegates
or framers were especially concerned with possible legislative abuse
of venue prerogatives that might have been otherwise available under
the vicinage provision.2 9 Quite the contrary, the Virginia code was
carried forward as the basic statutory law of West Virginia and it
contained some venue provisions which could be justified only under
the more liberal vicinage requirement of the old Virginia constitution.
It would be quite implausible to suggest that the constitutional draftsmen of West Virginia had views in regard to criminal venue that were
considerably opposed to those of the initial legislators of this state.
Again more reasonable explanation for the change lies elsewhere.
It is more likely that the shift in terminology was motivated by
something other than a conscious desire to place significantly narrower restraints upon the legislature in regard to its power to
determine proper venue for criminal cases. A political structure that
29

A search of

DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE FiRST CONSTITUTIONAL

CONVENTION OF WEST VMGINIA,

1861-63 (Ambler Ed.) reveals no discussion

on the content of the venue provision. The county based venue concept was
not changed in the 1873 Constitution.
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focused upon a county based organization, a court and jury selection
system that operated under a county basis, a general common law
concept of county as the proper venue unit for criminal trials, the
apparent lure of precision and refinement that comes with resort
to definite terms such as "county" as opposed to general terms
such as "vicinage"-all these influences no doubt contributed to a
state of mind that viewed a constitutional venue provision tied to
county as quite natural, convenient, and appropriate. To argue that
the shift from vicinage to county should carry broad policy implications asks too much. Quite the contrary, while the denotative
differences in the terms demand different results in particular
instances in Virginia and in West Virginia, it would be unwise to
read broad connotative differences into the term that would today
discourage a liberal attitude toward legislative authority in this area.
Venue came to be a matter of fundamental concern and thus found
its way into constitutional expression because of the serious threat
to the jury as a democratizing institution. The attempts of the royal
government to manipulate the jury threatened to remove its power
to act as a body that could legitimate or nullify laws in accord with
popular feeling. The threat of transportation to England for trial
of an offense committed wholly within the colonies posed a challenge
for the first time in history, to the jury as a buffer between "harsh
law," as Blackstone put it, and the "liberties of the people.'"" The
potential loss of this kind of democratic protection provoked the great
demand of the Revolutionary Era for the privilege of trial by a jury
of the vicinage. This central historic rationale may be preserved
today whether the specific state constitutional provisions perpetuating
it are generously or grudgingly interpreted so long as the defendant is
not deprived of the right to a trial by a jury drawn from a community
that has some actual connection with the crime involved. There
is no value to be served by exaggerating restrictions that may be
extrapolated from the happenstance differences in the wording
of present state constitutions. The essential role of the jury as a democratizing institution is not threatened by recognizing in the West
Virginia legislature the power to fix venue in any county where a
substantial element of an offense has occurred. Such a standard
would on the contrary be faithful to the central historic rationale.
Existing West Virginia case doctrine would not deny such legislative authority. But, it does not positively support such authority
30 4

BACKSTONE, Com.* 350.
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either. In fact, present West Virginia case law is not even neutral
on the matter. In sum, there really is no doctrine of venue in the

constitutional sense in West Virginia. It's not that there are no
decisions. Decisions are plentiful, and rules, specific rules, abound.
It's the connecting principle that is absent. The idea of a general
principle underlying the constitutional venue provision is apparently
not repugnant or objectionable. It's just that it doesn't seem to have
been discovered yet.
The causes for this ad hoc-ish, scattergun pattern of case decisions
are essentially twofold. First, and most important, the close connection between the constitutional issue of venue and the common
law concept of venue has just about overwhelmed the court in its
approach to the venue issue. The problem is persistently viewed
from the particulars of the crime involved, not from the generalities
of the constitutional concerns for venue. The fact that there may be
some general constitutional issue present is lost in the fascinating
common law methodology of dissecting a crime to ferret out a venue
giving element. A second and contributing cause is the legislative
lethargy. Statutory intrusion into the area has been sproadic."
More exercise of the legislative power might have forced some respect
for legislative prerogative. The constitutional potential has atrophied
instead.
a The following provisions are found in Ch. 61 of the W. VA. CODE
dealing with venue: art. 2, §14(b) (kidnapping); art. 2, §14(d) (aiders and
abettors in kidnapping); art. 2, §§18-22 (offenses related to dueling); art. 3,
§19 (possession of stolen property); art. 8, §8 (procuring a female for
prostitution); art. 9, §4 (enjoining maintenance of a house of prostitution)art. 11, §7 (general accessory provision); art. 11, §10 (offenses committed
wholly or in part without the state but made punishable within); art. 11,
§11 (crimes committed on the boundary line between counties); art. 11, §12
(homicide cases where injury and death occur in different counties). In Ch.
62, one provision bears directly on venue. That is found in art. 8, §3 and
deals with prisoners.
The legislature has provided liberal rules for the prosecution of nonsupport cases. W. VA. CODE c. 48, art. 8, §6 (Michie 1966). State v.
Kessinger, 144 W. Va. 209, 107 S.E.2d 367 (1959) held that while the
prosecution was criminal, defendant could not complain about the venue in
county to which his children moved after leaving the paternal home in another
county "An offense of nonsupport can be tried in any county in which the
accused or the wife, child or children may be at the time such offense, or
any part thereof, took place or where the offender may be at the time such
complaint is made. See Code, 48-8-6." Id., at 212, 107 S.E.2d at 370. While
determinations of paternity are deemed civil and need be proved only by a
preponderance of the evidence, the issue of nonsupport must be proved
as a crime. In Kessinger, the conviction was reversed for not applying the
reasonable doubt burden of proof. The cursory treatment of the venue objection, the court didn't even note the constitutional provision applicable, leaves
some doubt as to whether the constitutional implications of the decision
were fully appreciated by the court at the time the ruling was made.
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Three statutes have fallen before the constitutional venue provision.
The cases dealing with these have given rise to instances which have
forced the court to come to grips with the constitutional dimension
of the venue issue. In general terms, these cases are the most productive of the lot in providing meaning for the constitutional issue
here involved. Other occasions where the court has considered
constitutional challenges to statutory venue provisions in which it
found the legislation valid are, on the other hand, quite disappointing
in terms of developing the constitutional doctrine. The cases, as a
result, are biased toward the negative. They are better at saying
why the legislature cannot act, but not very informative as to why
the legislature can act. This condition is not the product of conscientously developed policy. It is more an accident.
The first statutory provision to fall before the constitutional venue
provision was a statute carried over from the Virginia code. It
attempted to provide for venue in either county when an offense
was committed within 100 yards of the county line.32 The case was
State v. Lowe.3" Judge Green's opinion holding the statute invalid
puts forth a productive and sound analysis of the problem involved.
While boundary line venue provisions were fairly common, Judge
Green was alert to the fact that variances in constitutional language
occurring among the states made the constitutional status of such
provisions different from state to state. Noting especially the shift
from "vicinage" to "county" in the change from the Virginia to the
West Virginia constitution, Judge Green concluded that the boundary
line provision absorbed from Virginia was invalid in West Virginia.
The decision is quite sound. The statute no doubt sought to resolve
a venue problem when the evidence is quivocal as to whether a crime
was committed in one county or another. However, the solution
would allow trial in a county where no part of the crime was committed. This too obviously runs afoul of the West Virginia constitutional provision. It should be noted however that while the term
county is inflexible, the term crime is not. In the course of reaching
his conclusion, Judge Green ventured an opinion as to the rationale
of the constitution venue provision:
The object of the constitutional provision is to protect the
accused against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part
3

2 W. VA. CODE

of 1868, ch. 52, §12 (now W.

VA. CODE

ch. 61, art. 11,

§11 (Michie 1966)).

3321 W. Va. 782 (1883).
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of the government, and against a spirit of violence and vindictiveness on the part of the people; and also to secure the accused
from being dragged to a trial at a distant part of the State,
away from his friends, witnesses and neighborhood, and thus be
subjected to the verdict of mere strangers, who may feel no
sympathy, or who may cherish against him animosity or
prejudice, and also to protect the accused from injustice
arising from his inability to procure proper witnesses, and to
save him from great expense. See State of Minnesota v. Robin-

son, 14 Minn. 454, and 2 Story on Con. sections 1780-81." 4
The boundary line statute, in spite of Judge Greene's ruling,
remained unchanged for nearly half a century before it was amended
in the general revision of the code in 193 1" Then it was changed so
as to provide for venue in either county when an offense is committed
on a boundary line between two counties. The problem resolved by
this statute seems more specious than serious but the ingenious
solution survives today as section 11, article 11 of chapter 62 of the
West Virginia Code. Unfortunately this effort fairly exemplifies
the quality and intensity of legislative concern for the problem.
The prisoner venue statute was the second to fall under the constitutional provision. This statute sought to provide exclusive jurisdiction in Marshall County for any crime committed by a convict
anywhere." It took two cases to bring this statute down. The first
was State v. Griffin3" which raised the question of whether the statute
could cut off the venue of a court in the county where the convict
actually committed an offense when this occurred outside Marshall
County. The court ruled in that case that the convict could be tried
in the county where the crime actually occurred, but skirted the
exclusiveness feature of the statute by suggesting that once a convict
had escaped there could be some question as to whether his status
as a convict continued, and thus, some question as to the applicability
of the statute. Griffin ruled in essence that a county other than
Marshall could provide venue when the crime was committed in
that county. But, Griffin did not resolve the question of whether
the state could effectively claim venue in Marshall County if the
crime were committed in some other county. That issue came
34

35

1931.3 6
37

Id. at 787.
See

REvisoRs

NoTE

to ch. 62, art. 11, §11 OFFICIAL CODE OF W. VA.

W.

VA. CODE c&. 62, art. 8, §3 (Michie 1966).
88 W. Va. 582, 107 S.E. 302 (1921).
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squarely before the court in State v. Dignan38 when the state sought
to prosecute a prisoner in Marshall County for an escape that was
alleged to have occurred in Braxton County while the prisoner
was there in custody working on a road gang. The court turned
aside the suggestion that the prisoner could be constructively deemed
present in Marshall County at the time of his criminal escape because
of his status as a prisoner. The court emphasized that conviction
for a felony did not alter in the slightest the convict's right to demand
the protection of the constitutional venue provision. Manifesting
some irritation for the rather artificial reasoning employed to escape
the constitutional issue in Griffin, the court laid down this rationale
in denying venue in Marshall County:
There is no room under the West Virginia Constitution to
interpret any statute as creating constructive venue of crime.
The crime itself or some act or element entering into it must
actually have taken place in the county where venue is laid and
the trial had. It is true that certain crimes, may take place and
be committed in more than one locality, in which case venue
may be laid in all or any one of such places. This, however, is
based upon actuality and not upon a legal fiction such as a
constructive venue. There is no room for such theorizing under
the West Virginia Constitution.39
It is anomalous that the court expresses such disdain for theorizing
at the very point where it makes the most significant contribution
to venue theory ever pronounced by the Supreme Court of Appeals.
No doubt the court was using the term theorizing in a pejorative
sense, seeking to condemn the artificiality and thinly verbal reasoning
that it had found disturbing in the Griffin opinion. Theorizing in
the sense that it is the art of articulating rules and principles that
explain the relationship between past appellate opinions, statutes,
and constitutional provisions is not to be criticized. Indeed it is the
essence of the appellate judicial function. No apology need be
offered. The unfortunate thing about the theorizing advanced by
the court in the Dignan decision is that it has gone so completely
unnoticed in West Virginia.
The third and only other instance in which a venue statute has
been nullified on constitutional grounds occurred in State v. Over38

39

114 W. Va. 275, 171 S.E. 527 (1933).
Id. at 278, 117 S.E. at 528.
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holt."° As Dignan responded to Griffin, the opinion in Overholt was

also shaped to a considerable degree as a reaction to an earlier case.
In this instance, however, the result exaggerated rather than compensated for the inadequacies of the opinion that preceded it.
Overholt was prosecuted in Greenbrier County as an accessory after
the fact for rendering assistance to one Cook who had allegedly
committed a robbery in Greenbrier County. According to the indictment Overholt's acts of aid and assistance occurred not in Greenbrier County but in neighboring Pocahontas County. Venue in
Greenbrier County was founded upon the statutory provisions dealing
with accessories generally which clearly said that accessories, either
before or after the fact, might be prosecuted where the principal
crime was committed." In two previous decisions, the West Virginia
court had held valid the provision for the trial of an accessory before
the fact in the county of the principal crime.42 The reasoning
involved in the first of these, State v. Ellison,"3 mesmerized the court
in Overholt. The consequences were most unfortunate. In Ellison,
the court had reasoned that the crime of accessory before the fact
did not occur until the principal crime was committed. Thus, the
crime of accessoryship must occur if at all at the very place where
the crime was accomplished, the court reasoned." ' With this bit of
time-space legerdemain, the court concluded that the venue statute
was quite sound so far as accessories before the fact were concerned.
Uncritically adopting this approach, the court in Overholt said:
The offense of accessory after the fact, however, being subsequent to, cannot in any sense be said to have occurred at the
time and place of, the principal crime. One does not become
an accessory after the fact by reason of any connection with
the crime itself, but because of his connection with the principal,
and an accessory after the fact is not regarded as a partaker
in the guilt of the principal, but his offense is considered as
111 W. Va. 417, 116 S.E. 317 (1932).
W. VA. CODE ch. 61 art. 11 §7 (Michie 1966): "An accessory ...
after the fact may . . . be indicted, convicted and punished in the county
in which he became accessory, or in which the principal felon may be
indicted ....
42 State v. EUison, 39 W. Va. 70, 38 S.E. 574 (1904); Wel v. Black, 76
W. Va.
4 3 685, 86 S.E. 666 (1915).
49 W. Va. 70, 38 S.E. 574 (1904).
44
"Ellison's crime was committed in Braxton County in the larceny
of the horse by the parties whom he counseled, aided and abetted in
the crime. All the counseling and directing he could have done would not
have made him liable to prosecution without the taking of the horse.
Id. at 74, 38 S.E. at 576.
40

4 1
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separate and independent of the main crime. 1 Brill, Cyc.
Cr. Law, 439; 1 Bishop, Cr. Law, (9th), 497: Yoe v. The
People, 49 Ill. 410; Reynolds v. The People, 83 Ill. 479; People
v. Galbo, 112 N.E. 1041; Strong v. State, 105 S. W. 785;
People v. Chadwick, 25 P. 737. Consequently, we are of
opinion that the statute insofar as it authorizes the indictment
and trial of an accessory after the fact in a county other than
that in which the accessorial acts are committed is in violation
of the constitutional provision.
The exorbitant concern for the nature of the crime of accessory
after the fact lead the court to produce an opinion that is a classic
example of how to discover irrelevant answers by asking the wrong
question. The court approached the issue as though it were seeking
to resolve a simple common law question, viz., absent legislation
on the matter where might an accessory after the fact be tried? This
quite clearly was not the issue before the court. The problem was

one of constitutional importance, not common law routineness. The
court was challenged to measure the power of the legislature to
declare by expressly worded statute that the offense of accessory
after the fact had sufficient contact with the county of the principal
offense to justify providing for venue there. By failing to perceive
the nature of this issue, the court unwittingly elevated contemporary
common law46 to constitutional status in West Virginia. Taken
literally, this view means that the dubious rules expressed with such
ardent ambiguity in the commercial encyclopedia cannot be changed
by deliberate act of the legislature. This is absurd. The court in
45 111 W. Va. at 419, 162 S.E. at 317. The court cites five cases dealing
with the nature of the crime of accessory after the fact in other jurisdictions.
None of these cases deal with the issue of venue or whether a legislature can
provide for trial in the venue district of the principal crime. Yoe v. People,
39 IM. 410 (1868) stated one charged with the principle offense could not
be convicted as an accessory after the fact under such an indictment; Reynolds
v. People, 83 Ill. 479 (1876) holds to the same effect; People v. Galbo, 218
N.Y. 283, 112 N.E. 1031 (1960) is a carefully reasoned opinion by Judge
Cardozo holding evidence insufficient to sustain a murder conviction though
the evidence may have shown defendant was guilty as an accessory after the
fact by helping to conceal a body after the victim of the crime had been
killed; Strong v. State, 52 Tex. Grim. 133, 105 S.W. 785 (1907) stresses
that under Texas statutes the term accessory was used exclusively to refer to
one who assisted after the crime; Chadwick v. People, 7 Utah 134, 25 P. 737
(1891) rules testimony by an accessory after the fact need not be corroborated
since such an accessory is not an accomplice. Likewise, Brill and Bishop in
the portions cited by the court deal only with the common law conception of
the nature of the offense only.
46 See text at notes 68, 69 infra for discussion of contemporary common
law.
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Overholt did not bother to explain why present common law doctrine
bound the legislature, but simply found something inherent in the
common law concept of the crime that put venue decisions with
regard to it beyond the range of legislative change. The court was
lured into this folly by the pattern of the Ellison decision. But
Ellison is quite different in that it justified a legislative venue choice
by constructing a common law result that was in accord. Following
the analysis of Ellison was folly because the reasoning in Ellison is
incomplete. The court there failed to explain why the statutory venue
rule was constitutional because it found the common law result to be
the same. A simple explanation for this exists and it is reasonably
sound. Since the constitution incorporates a kind of common law
concept of venue, a statute that fixes venue as it would have been at
common law cannot contravene the general spirit of the constitutional
provision. This does not mean, however, that a statute fixing venue
differently than the common law is by virtue of that fact unconstitutional. The court committed a simple logical error. To establish
that all dogs are mammals does not prove that all species other than
dogs are not mammals. To establish that a common law venue rule
enacted into statute is constitutional does not prove that a venue
rule differing with the common law is thus unconstitutional. But that
was the effect that the court gave the Ellison decision in Overholt.
Before pushing on to issues raised by Willis v. O'Brien," ' one case
upholding a statute with venue provisions deserves serious consideration. This case is Ex parte McNeely.48 While its primary concern
is subject matter jurisdiction, it sheds important light upon venue.
The case involved a challenge to the West Virginia statute which
provides for trial in a county in this state where a death occurs
even where the mortal blow causing that death was inflicted outside
the state.49 McNeely was indicted for inflicting a mortal blow in
Kentucky which resulted in the death of his victim just inside the
West Virginia border. The crucial issue in the case was the power
of the state of West Virginia to exercise jurisdiction over this criminal
event. Which county within the state could claim venue posed
a matter of lesser magnitude. The opinion was written by Judge
Brannon, certainly one of the most forceful and articulate judges ever
to occupy the bench of the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals.s" A peculiar timidity and uncertainty however marked his
153 S.E.2d 178 (W. Va. 1967).
36 W. Va. 84, 14 S.E. 436 (1892).
49
W. VA. CODE ch. 61, art. 2, §6 (Michie 1966).
47

4 8
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opinion in McNeely. He cited the state constitutional venue provision,
then admitted the case might really involve a question of international
law, as he called it, and eventually resolved the case by reference
to the rule that legislative acts are presumed valid. "A court must
be slow and cautious to overthrow [the legislature's] action ...
To doubt only is to affirm the validity of its action. I resolve my
doubt this way."'" Despite its uncertainty, in fact because of it, the
opinion is important. McNeely demonstrates the parallel mode of
thinking that predominates traditional approaches to issues of venue
and subject matter jurisdiction. But venue and jurisdiction protect
significantly different underlying values. The failure to note the
distinction operates much to the disadvantage of the venue concept.
Underlying jurisdictional concerns promote the view that there is
something inherently right, natural and necessary in the assumption
that each crime has but one right and proper place where it may
be tried. Pinpointing the single place in time and space that a crime
occurs responds to a strongly entrenched tradition of common law
concept of territorial jurisdiction. This view insists that the laws
of the state may operate only within the geographical area occupied
by that sovereign. To allow the substantive law of a state to escape
its boundaries could raise difficulties with due process concerns of
fair notice, with the possibility of multiple punishment and provoke
a foreboding mass of conflict of criminal law issues. The lure of
the territorial jurisdiction concept grows from its promise to provide
a means of avoiding such onerous problems. But the territorial
jurisdiction theory exacts a price for the security it offers. As a
jurisdictional theory it forces a strained and artificial mode of
thought by insisting that a criminal event which may in reality
touch upon several locales must be viewed as having occurred in but
one place.52 That it is plainly unsatisfactory in certain instances is
demonstrated by the very statute before the court-and approved by
the court-in McNeely. Considered in the context of its own concerns, the territorial jurisdiction principle is open to considerable
doubt. When this one-crime, one-place way of thinking is unwittingly
accepted as obligatory in the approach to venue issues, its disadvant50
See generally Reid, Henry Brannon and Marmaduke Dent: The Shapers
of West Virginia Law, 65 W. VA. L. REv. 19, 99 (1962-63).
5136 W. Va. at 95, 14 S.E. at 439.
52 See George, ExtraterritorialApplication of Penal Legislation, 64 Mici.
L. REv. 609, 621-29 (1966). See also Berg, Criminal Jurisdiction and the
Terrigorial Principle,30 MicH. L. REv. 238 (1931); Note, Realism v. Territorialism: jurisdiction to Prosecute for Non-Support of Bastards, 6 STAN. L.
REV. 709 (1954).
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ages are magnified. It is patently unnecessary to constrict venue to
avoid problems of fair notice, multiple punishment, or conflict of
laws concerns. Assuming jurisdiction exists-that is a separate
matter-venue deals with only the problem of where within a given
jurisdiction trial may be held. Nonetheless, the single-place mode
of thought persists as a significant influence in the venue area.
Perplexed by this habit of thought-and influenced by the constitutional venue provisions-Judge Brannon in McNeely was clearly
troubled and uncertain as to how to resolve the case. He literally
capitulated to the legislative choice. The case is important for what
it illustrates-a strong judge rather bewildered by a powerful
influence of the common law narrow territorial jurisdiction concept,
a pragmatic legislative change of that view, and the uncertain thrust
of the constitutional venue provision.
We turn now to Willis v. O'Brien to find that bewilderment and
confusion still surround the basic issues of venue. The issue in the
case was simply posed. Willis was charged with performing a criminal
abortion in Brooke County that resulted in the death of the woman
involved in Ohio County. Prosecution for murder was started in
Ohio County and Willis sought to prohibit the proceeding there on
grounds that venue was not proper in Ohio County. Affirming the
ruling of the court below, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals ruled that venue was proper in Ohio County. There are three
facets of the opinion that are of interest which will be examined
here. First, there is an assertion made in regard to the nature of the
venue issue that insists that it raises a problem different than subject
matter jurisdiction. Second, there are three distinct reasons advanced
by the court to support its conclusion that venue in Ohio County
is proper. Third, there is a fascinating interplay that evolves from
the marshalling of constitutional, common law, and statutory sources
of authority that reflects the persistence of the curiously puzzling
nature of the venue issue generally in West Virginia.
The court starts its analysis of the case by asserting that venue
and subject matter jurisdiction are not one in the same. "Jurisdiction
is the constitutional endowment of power to hear and determine' 53a
cause . . . Venue, on the other hand, is merely the place of trial.
It is rare in the annals of West Virginia venue decisions that the court
overtly addresses itself to the nature of the venue issue. Rather than
place the problem into the general scheme of things in the legal order,
53 153 S.E.2d at 180.
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the court has traditionally sprinted ahead to the substance of the
venue issue as it conceived it. But here, the court first sought to put
the nature of the issue in perspective. The suggestion of the court
is sound, but it is all together too lightly made. Many important
implications that necessarily flow from this statement are left hanging
in a most ambiguous state. The only authority noted by the court
to support its position is a reference to Michie's Jurisprudence. Even
when relevant, that tepid collection of cliches is something less than
convincing. But here, a wholly irrelevant portion is cited. The
section refered to deals with venue in civil actions." Since there is
no constitutional provision bearing upon venue in civil litigation,
statements pertaining to the very status of civil venue are quite
unpersuasive when applied to the constitutionally encumbered matter
of criminal venue. Moreover, to give credence to the court's assertion,
prior West Virginia case law which appears to be contrary ought
fairly to be distinguished or acknowledged in some way. The earliest
West Virginia decisions involving venue used the language of jurisdiction in speaking of the issue. Failure to establish venue meant the
case was "not within the jurisdiction" of the court, these opinions
said." These cases might be put aside as reflecting merely inapt
choice of language and it could be plausibly argued that they do not
reflect conscious determinations of policy that are essentially contrary
to what is asserted in Willis. Additionally, there is something of a
contrary implication emanating from the recent case of Pyles v.
Bowles. 6 In that case, the court dealt on the merits with a venue
complaint in a habeas corpus proceeding. In light of the West
Virginia Supreme Court's rigid policy toward confining state habeas
corpus remedies to purely jurisdictional matters, and not considering
"'mere errors of law" in such collateral proceedings, it seems fair to
imply that in some respects the venue issue has been treated as jurisdictional in some sense in very recent years.5" The status of the
venue issue is a matter deserving of careful consideration. It has
not received it yet by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.
54
5

The cite is to 19

Micqm'S

JUIUSPRUDENCE OF

VA. & W. VA.

§2

(1952).

See State v. Mills, 33 W. Va. 455, 10 S.E. 808 (1890) (homicide
conviction reversed where the court found no evidence in the record that the
killing occurred "within the jurisdiction of the court"). Accord Hoover v.
Stoke, I W. Va. 335 (1866) (larceny).
56 148 W. Va. 465, 135 S.E.2d 692 (1964).
57
_ See Note, Habeas Corpus in West Virginia, 69 W. VA. L. REv. 293
(1967). State post conviction relief has been broadened considerably by the
enactment of a Habeas Corpus Act of 1967, W. Va. Acts 1967 ch. 85, now
W. VA. CODE, ch. 53, art. 4 (Michie Supp. 1967).
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The earliest cases seem to have required that the venue be pleaded
upon the face of the indictment; intervening cases have indicated that
any shred of evidence supporting such an allegation will suffice if
the jury finds the defendant guilty; Pyles supports the view that venue
matters may be raised in collateral proceedings at least where the
issue is obvious on the face of the indictment; and finally, Willis
states generally that the issue of venue is of a lesser magnitude than
that of subject matter jurisdiction. There would seem to be two
matters that ought to be resolved with respect to the nature of the
venue issue and how it is handled procedurally. First, should failure
to press a legal issue concerning venue prior to trial constitute a
waiver of any complaint.5" Second, should the judge or the jury
determine fact issues bearing upon venue. The first matter raises
the problem of whether a defendant should be allowed to wait until
the outcome of the trial is known and still have the option of raising
the venue issue. The readiness of the court to consider the venue
issue in habeas proceedings in Pyles v. Boles indicates the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals may deem this fair game for the
defendant. The statement in Willis is suggestive of an opposite conclusion. Since the early cases developed the rule that venue must
be pleaded in the indictment, the defendant should always be forewarned of the basis of the venue theory of the prosecution. A bill
of particulars and pre-trial motion challenging venue should seem to
provide adequate opportunity both to clarify any doubts as to the
prosecution theory of venue and resolve any question of law pertaining to venue prior to trial. The resolution of fact issues-that is,
did the venue giving element occur within the county of trialhas traditionally been left to the jury. 9 It's doubtful that this is
the proper way to resolve such issues, though the matter has
rarely been raised.6" The matter of whether the crime was com58 See Hicks v. Commonwealth, 157 Va. 939, 161 S.E. 919 (1932).
(Question of venue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.)
59 See State v. Bragg, 140 W. Va. 585, 87 S.E.2d 689 1955) (evidence
generally supporting view that death occurred in county of homicide prosecution, court holds issue of venue was properly determined by jury); State v.
Hobbs, 37 W. Va. 812, 17 S.E. 380 (1893) (jury could presume murder
occurred within county of trial because justice of the peace who acted as
coroner was a justice of that county and was presumed to act in official
capacity only within the county.) Some cases have held that instructions in
regard to venue need not be given the jury where there is no material issue
in regard to that issue. See, e.g., State v. Bostich, 243 S.C. 14, 131 S.E.2d
841 (1963); People v. Anderson, 355 Il. 289, 189 N.E. 338 (1934).
60 See discussion of the issue in People v. Megladdery, 40 Cal. App. 2d
748, 106 P.2d 84 (1940), which held that the venue issue must go to the jury
until the legislature chooses to make a change in that practice. But see State v.
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mitted within the county does not go to the guilt or innocence of
the accused, but only to the propriety of holding trial in that particular
county. There is a rather close analogy here to the Supreme Court's
doctrine in Jackson v. Denno" that a jury concerned with determining
guilt or innocence cannot be employed as the final determiner of the
admissibility of a confession when its admissibility is challenged on
constitutional grounds. A technical objection, such as venue, is
probably similarly susceptible to being prejudiced by concerns for
guilt-innocence determinations to be properly left to the regular
trial jury." The issue has not been pressed in the West Virginia
cases, but it would seem entirely proper that common practice of
placing fact determination of venue issues in the jury's hands is the
product of mere habit and not the result of considered choice.
We turn now to the three arguments advanced by the court in
Willis to sustain its conclusion. We will savor the brew that results
from this blend in a moment, but first the ingredients merit separate
examination. The first of the arguments advanced by the court
follows the "crucial event" or "gist of the offense" analysis. This
procedes along the traditional path of drawing and quartering the
crime so as to lay bare its elements and disclose that single happening which gives the crime its unique locus. 3 Quite understandably
this mode of analysis in a homicide prosecution focuses attention
upon the event of death and the court identifies this occurrence as
the all important one. The insistence upon the extraordinary importance of this one event in relation to the entire crime seems to
raise unnecessarily some doubt as to the capacity of the court to
convict for a lesser included offense where the elements of that
lesser offense occurred without the county. The distorted emphasis
which the crucial event test provokes suggests that there is perhaps
something wrong with the test itself. It would be patently ludicrous
Moore, 140 La. 281, 72 So. 965 (1916) holding venue is an issue for the
judge since it bears upon the place of trial and has nothing to do with the
issue of guilt. See Hubert, History of Jurisdictionand Venue in Criminal Cases
in Louisiana, 34 TurL. L. REv. 255 (1960).
61 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
62 A reading of West Virginia decisions bearing upon confessions prior to
the Jackson v. Denno decision, supra note 61, shows some blurring of the
issues of confession admissibility and guilt. The opinions suggest that the
confession must have been reliable since the jury found the defendant guilty.
See State v. Vance, 146 W. Va. 925, 124 S.E.2d 252 (1962); State v. Brady,
104 W. Va. 523, 140 S.E. 546 (1927); State v. Mayle, 108 W. Va. 681, 152
S.E. 633 (1930).
63 State v. Harrah, 101 W. Va. 300, 132 S.E. 654 (1926); State v.
McAllister, 65 W. Va. 97, 63 S.E. 758 (1901).
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to suggest that a jury in Ohio County could not find the defendant
Willis guilty of abortion if it found the death of the woman involved
was not casually related to a proven act of abortion performed in
Brooke County. The artificial nature of the crucial event test becomes
embarrassingly obvious at this point. Nonetheless, the second argument advanced by the court is even more troublesome. This position
is supported by an agency theory that seems uniquely hostile to the
most important underlying values of the venue doctrine. Indeed,
the employment of the agency argument shows how terribly easy it
is to confuse subject matter jurisdiction with venue. The anomaly
of confusing the two issues is particularly poignant here in view
of the express disclaimer stated by the court at the very outset of
its opinion regarding the clear distinction between issues of venue
and subject matter jurisdiction. The agency fiction has been employed
to avoid undesirable limitations that would otherwise have arisen
from a strict application of the territorial notions of subject matter
jurisdiction. The classic case arose in Georgia where that state
claimed jurisdiction over an attempted murder when the intended
fatal shot was fired outside the state towards a victim within the
state." Fortunately the shot missed, but the court rested its jurisdiction over the attempt on the fiction that the defendant constructively
followed his missile into the state and thus, in contemplation of law,
was present inGeorgia committing the attempt. The question arises,
why should the state not have jurisdiction over the attempt if it had
been ineffectual because of a misfire rather than a misaim? This
little dilemma tempts us to drift further away into arguments about
the merits of the territorial jurisdiction, but it is precisely because
we are so easily diverted from the true issues involved that the
employment of the agency concept is so utterly inappropriate as a
vehicle to resolve venue problems. To say that the defendant
Willis was constructively present in Ohio County because he "put in
force an agency which, .

.

. could result in the crime,"" is to resort

to a fiction that only serves to mask the real nature of the problem
confronting the court. 6 Employment of such a fiction also incidentally runs directly counter to the thoroughly sound statement of
State v. Dignan that there is no room under the West Virginia con153 S.E.2d 178, 181 (W. Va. 1967).
Simpson v. State, 92 Ga. 41, 17 S.E. 984 (1893).
66 Compare Hodge v. Sands Mfg. Co., 150 S.E.2d 793 (W. Va. 1966)
where the court goes to some pains to insist that mere harm within the state
caused by misconduct outside the state is necessary in order for West Virginia
to claim jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant in civil litigation.
64
65
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stitution for constructive venue. 6" The third argument advanced
by the court is statutory. The statute is one patterned after parliament's first remedial venture in the venue field enacted in 1548.
It reads as follows:
If a mortal wound or other violence or injury be inflicted, or
poisoned administered, in one county, and death ensue therefrom
in another county, the offense may be prosecuted in either.6 8
The usual two stage argument is here involved: The statute does
not apply and if it does, it is unconstitutional. First the court
characterizes the statute as remedial. This is at best a dubious
classification,69 but be that as it may, it would help resolve the
reach of the statute for, by tradition, remedial statutes are interpreted
broadly, and thus doubts as to the applicability of the statute ought
to be resolved by holding that it does apply to the case before the
court. But this is not the use made of the remedial characterization.
Rather, the court said the statute ought to be deemed constitutional
because it is remedial. It is quite novel to suggest that remedial
statutes enjoy a special state of constitutional grace. But there is
still another argument advanced on the constitutionality issue. The
court insisted on relying upon the rule that holds where two interpretations of a statute are available, that which preserves the
constitutionality ought to be employed. This canon of construction
would urge a strict and narrow interpretation of statutes to avoid
constitutional pitfalls, and quite obviously pulls in the opposite
direction from the remedial statute argument. Though this advice
as to interpretation had been ignored and the statute had been
applied broadly, the court went ahead to insist that this rule of
construction supported the constitutionality of the broad interpretation. That's rather like having your cake and eating it. At any
rate, the statute was held constitutional.
Considered separately, each of the three arguments advanced by
the court to sustain its conclusion in Willis is interesting. But the
relationship between the three is even more fascinating. Why, if
there is a valid statute fixing venue in Ohio County, must the court
resort to the strain of the crucial event test and drag in the agency
6 7

114 W. Va. 275, 278, 171 S.E. 527 528 (1933).
ch. 61, art. 11, § 12 (Michie 1966).
The common law was changed by act of Parliament in 1548. Such an
early act would normally be deemed a part of the common law absorbed in
America, see note 73 infra. If the statute merely restates the common law,
it hardly can be deemed a remedial statute since the law would be the same
without such a statute on the books.
68
W. VA. CODE
69
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fiction? If these arguments are necessary at all, why are they given
first attention in the opinion and the statutory argument added at the
end as a kind of makeweight? The puzzling and disjointed admixture
of these various arguments suggests that we still approach venue
issues as though we were seeking to measure the temperature of a
legal proposition by adding so many miles of common law, with
so many gallons of statutes, with the square root of a yet to be
discovered constitutional proposition. This unhappy state of affairs
persists because we still must grope for the beginnings of a theory
that will explain the relationship between common law and the
constitutional provision. The peculiar blend of arguments advanced
in the Willis opinion demonstrates this very important threshold
problem continues to escape unresolved.
There are two broad ways in which this crucial relationship between the common law and the constitutional provision might
be explained. A much clearer understanding of the nature of the
venue concept in this state would evolve if a knowing choice were
made. First, we might assert that the constitutional provision simply
incorporates the common law of venue. At first blush this appears
alluringly simple, and this view seems to underlie some of the
decisions. But a more thorough consideration raises some serious,
indeed, I suggest insurmountable, problems. Second, the constitutional provision can be viewed as preserving only the essential
underlying principle of common law venue but not compelling any
express common law rules be given constitutional status per se. This
rule would leave more flexibility with the legislature and would not
condemn legislative choice of venue merely by showing a common
law choice would provide a different result.
If the common law were a "brooding omnipresence in the sky," °
to borrow Justice Holmes' immortal phrase, the incorporation theory
would be easier to accept. That is not the way the common law is,
and consequently the incorporation theory gives rise to some extraordinarily difficult problems. Since there is no super-national, transsovereign body of common law that will produce "true rules" for the
judges to "discover," the intelligent adoption of the incorporation
theory demands that a specific body of controlling common law
rules must be identified with some degree of precision. And if this
choice is made we must follow with the troublesome subsequent
70 Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 234 U.S. 205, 218-22; (1917)
(Holmes
J.,
dissenting opinion).
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question, why this particular set of common law rules? Could the
incorporation here adopt the rules of common law as they existed
before any parliamentary change took place; that is, to the pure,
legislatively unblemished, case developed common law? Such a body
of doctrine would forbid, you will recall, the prosecution of a murder
if the mortal blow and the death occurred in different counties. This
concept is so universally rejected that it is plainly implausible that
the common law doctrine incorporated by the constitution should
force such a ludicrous view. Another incorporation theory could
embrace the common law rules which existed at the time of the
American Revolution. This would include the older parliamentary
changes. But if these statutes were a part of the common law
adopted as the constitutional standard, how does it happen then
that we seem to insist upon statutes to provide this kind of venue
choice in this country. It is arguable of course that many common
law rules were repeated in statutes simply to resolve doubts, or
out of a kind of parroting habit in code making. But even if this
affords an explanation, we still must resolve the dilemma of crimes
created anew after the common law book of crimes was closed. The
natural response is to suggest as to new crimes-such radical inventions as embezzlement and false pretense for example-could be
accorded venue by analogy to their common law forebearers. This
general incorporation theory never seems to have been consciously
adopted by the West Virginia courts. The court to this date has
simply not embraced this view. When faced with venue issues regarding embezzlement, the court turned not to the analogy of larceny, its
common law predecessor, but rather to the present common law
consensus of other states.7" When challenged on the venue provided
by modern-day kidnapping, this court dismissed venue objections
out of hand, showing no concern for common law venue rules with
regard to kidnapping. 2 And in the Willis case, the court referred to
the commonplace two-county murder rule as remedial. How could
the statute be remedial if the same rule existed by virtue of absorbed
common law.73 Though it is not entirely free of problems, an
incorporation theory adopting common law rules at the time of
separation from England could be embraced. The major reasons
for suggesting that it should not now be embraced are practical. To
71 See State v. Pietranton, 140 W. Va. 444, 84 S.E.2d 774 (1954); State
v. Berle,
117 W. Va. 825, 188 S.E. 481 (1936).
7
2 Pyles v. Bowles, 148 W. Va. 465, 135 S.E.2d 692 (1964).
73 See generally Manoukian v. Pomasian, 237 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1936);
GRAY, TnE NATURE "D SoURcEs OF =HELAw, 196 97 (2d Ed. 1938).
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clearly identify this body of common law rules as those which are
crystalized in the West Virginia constitution would be an innovation.
Though provided with numerous opportunities to do so in a century
of litigation, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia simply
has not specifically adopted any set of common law rules as
constitutionally controlling." Admittedly, clear and conscious adoption of any precisely defined position now would be an innovation,
and innovation might just as well be done for the best available policy
consequences. There is of course a final incorporation theory to be
considered. This would refer the court, for a constitutional standard,
to the contemporary consensus of common law venue rules for a
particular crime. This was the result of the court's action in Overhold"5 and it seems patently inappropriate. The primary flaw with
this view is that there is no such thing as a general common law
of the United States. There are generalizations that can be made,
to be sure, about the trend, or consensus, of rules in the various legal
systems which make up the United States, but these do not in any
meaningful sense produce a common law of the United States.
After all, the basic advantage of the incorporation theory would
arise from the fact that it incorporates specific rules, not that it would
refer to generalities or indefinite guides. To suggest that the incorporation theory would point the court to a consensus of decisions
from other states influenced by many unknown and undiscovered
statutory and constitutional provisions in those states simply has
nothing to commend it.76 It is reasonable for the Supreme Court of
Appeals in seeking to fix venue for an embezzlement charge to look
7
4 It is important to note that though the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals has frequently employed common law methodology in analyzing
venue issues, it has not at any time articulated what specifics of common law
rules might be deemed controlling.
75 State v. Overholt, 111 W. Va. 417, 162 S.E. 317 (1932).
76 A major problem here is that the underlying influences of decisions
in other states, peculiarities of statutes and constitutional provisions, bear upon
the consensus of these decisions and obviously are inappropriate to influence
the constitutional doctrines of West Virginia. The citation of cases in Willis
is revealing. In connection with the application of the agency theory, the
court noted two decisions, one from Michigan and one from Indiana. The
Michigan case, People v. Southwick, 272 Mich. 258, 261 N.W. 320 (1935)
dealt with an abortion situation identical to that in Willis. The court held
that the Michigan statute which provides for a homicide in the county of
death when death results from a wound inflicted in another county was
"broad enough to cover the case" and considered the constitutionality of the
statute as clearly established. Unlike West Virginia, Michigan recognizes the
constitutional validity of venue based upon an event proximate to a boundary
line of a county and also allows change of venue by prosecuting officers.
West Virginia is opposite on both these points. See State v. Lowe, 21 W. Va.
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to the consensus of American decisions on that matter so long as the
legislature of West Virginia has not spoken upon the issue. But if
the legislature has spoken, it is quite inappropriate to assume that the
consensus of case decisions around the United States fixes the constitutional standard for this state which the legislature may not change.
Such a view would imply that any legislative intrusion into the venue
area would either be superfluous or unconstitutional. That patently
is ridiculous. Since the so-called common law of venue extant at
the time the West Virginia constitutions were adopted included a good
bid of legislative therapy, it is difficult to accept the principle that the
constitutional provision was intended to forever forbid any legislative
intervention in the area at all.
The shift to the view that the constitutional provision carries forward not the specifics of any set of common law rules but only the
essential underlying principles produces a much sounder position.
Differences between rules of different times and places fade in
importance. What remains significant is the more important general
underlying principles of venue. These are not difficult to identify.
The revolutionary background insists that the locale of a trial may not
be so manipulated as to deprive a defendant of a jury drawn from
a community which has some actual connection with the criminal
activity. 7 The use of county as a venue district in West Virginia
782 (1883); State ex rel. Cosner v. See, 129 W. Va. 722, 42 S.E.2d 31

(1947). The general thrust of the Michigan venue provision seems quite
different than that in West Virginia and simple case by case comparisons
ought to be undertaken without considerable caution. The Indiana case Hauk
v. State, 148 Ind. 238, 46 N.E. 127, 47 N.E. 465 (1897) again parallels the
Willis case on the facts but the legal doctrine of venue in Indiana has a
considerably different background. Venue in the Indiana abortion case was
grounded upon a statute unlike any in West Virginia which provides "where
a public offense has been committed partly in one county and partly in
another, or the acts or effects constituting or requisite to the consummation
of the offense occur in two or more counties, the jurisdiction is in either
county." This statute was held to be adequate to afford abortion-homicide
venue in the county where the death occurred. The statute had previously
been held constitutional in Archer v. State, 106 Ind. 426, 7 N.E. 225
(1886), where the court observed that there was no substantial diversity of
opinion as to the power of the legislature to provide such venue, citing
from other states but ignoring the constitutional provision in Indiana.
decisions
77
It must be admitted that there is some ambivalence in the statement of
historic rationale concerning venue. It is sometimes advanced in the opinions
that venue is intended to insure a defendant a trial near his home. "The
Constitution of our State guarantees every man a right to be tried at his
home, in his county, where the alleged offense was committed. Many men
had been denied this right, and had been dragged from their homes to be
tried by strangers for alleged offenses, thus denying to them the influence of
a good life upon the men who were to try them .. " State v. Greer, 22
W. Va. 800, 804 (1883). (The statements were volunteered by Judge
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further demands that the criminal activity must have some connection
with the county where the trial is sought and venue districts may
not be determined by judicial circuits or any other geographical or
political subdivisions of the state. But, it should also be noted that
the common law did not insist that there be but one place (be it
county, district, or however the venue district be identified) where
the crime occurred. A crime might touch several venue districts
and when this occurred, trial could be in any."8 The habit of viewing
each crime as having but one place where it may be tried is not a
common law venue principle, but at most a by-product of a related,
but independent, concept of subject matter jurisdiction.
What follows is the conclusion that the legislature in West Virginia
can validly adopt a venue statute that would provide for trial in any
county where a substantial element of a crime occurred. There should
be no objection further to requiring issues of law pertaining to the
venue question to be raised prior to trial or deemed waived. Moreover, issues of fact pertaining to venue should be tried by the court
and not by the jury. The law question could be resolved by requiring
a pin-pointing of the venue-giving element or elements prior to trial
and by requiring before trial a determination of whether the proof
of these elements within the county would support venue. The fact
issues pertaining to these elements could be resolved by the judge
either prior to trial or at the trial as his discretion would direct.
Such a scheme would insure the defendant his fundamental venue
privilege of having his trial before a jury drawn from a proper
community but would also insist that the question with regard to
venue could not be held in reserve to upset an otherwise fair trial
on the merits.
Johnson as he approached the question of the trial court's refusal to change
venue at the defendant's request.) See also Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va.
(21 Gratt.) 790 (1871) where the court in part justified trial in the county
where the prison was located for an offense committed by a prisoner while
on a work gang in another county on the ground that "if he can be said to
have a vicinage at all, that vicinage as to him is within the laws of the
penetentiary, which (if not literally and actually) yet in the eye of the law
surrounds him wherever he may go, until he is lawfully discharged." Id. at 799.
Literally taken, the Virginia provision does refer to trial by a jury of "his
vicinage." And would seem to demand trial at a man's home rather than
at the locale of the crime. The common interpretation is quite to the
contrary however.
78 W. VA. CoDE ch. 61, art. 11, §12 (Michie 1966) (Codifying the common law rule in regard to mortal blow and death in different counties venue
in either); W. VA. CODE ch. 61, art. 3, §19 (Michie 1966) (broad venue
for receiving stolen property offense perpetuating the common law concept
of continuing trespass which broadened venue considerably. See note 17 supra.
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This paper has wandered rather far and wide. To bring it to a
close, let me capsulize the broader arguments I have advanced. First,
the history behind state constitutional venue provisions does not
demand narrow or stringent interpretations of those provisions with
regard to general legislative authority, but it does insist that the
basic principle to be preserved is one of demanding some kind of
connection between the place of a crime and the place of its trial;
second, the West Virginia constitutional provision clearly fixed the
county as the venue unit for this state, but it does not follow that
the adoption of a narrow geographical unit for venue locale compels
a narrow limit on legislative powers to determine in which county or
counties a crime is deemed to be committed. Third, the relationship
between common law and constitution in regard to venue should
properly be viewed as one in which the constitution carries forward
general common law principles and not specific common law rules.
Finally, the unstated assumption that most crimes must be viewed
as having occurred in but one place, no matter how much they may
have touched a variety of counties, is not a component part of the
common law principles of venue but is product of a habitual way
of looking at the problem which is provoked by irrelevant concerns
of an obsolescent view of subject matter jurisdiction. If these views
are correct, then West Virginia venue law suffers needlessly and the
legislature ought to move to correct the situation.
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